Home News Terrorism in Africa: Explaining the Rise of Extremist Violence Towards Civilians

Terrorism in Africa: Explaining the Rise of Extremist Violence Towards Civilians


Terrorism on the continent of Africa has been rising sharply over the last decade. Non-state (terrorist teams, militias, insurgent teams, and so on.) have more and more focused civilians of their campaigns of violence. From Somalia to Mali and Nigeria to Mozambique, the continent has repeatedly witnessed grisly acts of violence concentrating on its civilian populations. Based on information from the Armed Battle Location and Occasion Information Undertaking (ACLED), in 2015 there have been 381 assaults concentrating on civilians in Africa leading to 1,394 fatalities. This quantity rose sharply all through the years and by 2020 there have been 7,108 assaults concentrating on civilians leading to 12,519 fatalities (see Determine 1) (Raleigh, et al 2010). The specter of terrorism has grown a lot on the continent that by 2020 seven of the highest 10 international locations on this planet by way of terrorism danger have been in Africa, based on world danger consultancy Verisk Maplecroft (Brown 2010).

Current analysis from the literature on terrorist concentrating on might provide a number of explanatory pathways to account for this pattern. Students have lengthy sought to elucidate how terrorist and rebel teams develop their concentrating on methods, together with the potential advantages they derive from numerous approaches. A few of these concentrating on methods could also be attributed to exterior elements, corresponding to inter-organizational competitors, or inside elements, corresponding to ideological justifications or principal-agent issues. At the very least two such theories are worthy of consideration within the African context and will assist clarify the pattern. First, {the marketplace} of violence on the continent is saturated with a wide range of armed teams—lots of that are affiliated with main worldwide terrorist teams corresponding to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State or ISIS —which are jockeying for affect, energy, and entry to sources. This competitors, as demonstrated within the literature, can result in elevated civilian concentrating on. Second, the non secular justifications for violence utilized by armed teams in Africa are additionally related to the indiscriminate concentrating on of civilians. Whereas many different elements contribute to terrorism in Africa, these two elements are notably vital for understanding the dramatic rise in civilian concentrating on.

The Empirical Weak spot of the Strategic Mannequin

Inside political science, a considerable physique of literature has sought to elucidate terrorist assaults, notably in opposition to civilian targets. The dominant theoretical paradigm is named the Strategic Mannequin of Terrorism. As its identify suggests, the Strategic Mannequin posits that aggrieved teams flip to terrorism as a result of it helps to realize their political platform (Abrahms 2008). This attitude has led students to conclude that violent teams goal civilians as a result of terrorism maximizes the percentages of political success given their operational constraints (Abrahms 2011; Pape 2003; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero 2005). The logic is compelling. Terrorists are presumed to be rational actors (Crenshaw 1981). And by definition, terrorists have political motives (Schmid 2012). Thus, persons are thought to interact in terrorism for the political return by coercing goal international locations into granting main concessions (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003).

But the Strategic Mannequin is stronger theoretically than empirically. Regardless of the logical attraction of this theoretical framework, it rests on a weak empirical foundation. In comparison with extra selective violence in opposition to authorities targets, indiscriminate violence in opposition to civilian targets is politically ineffective, even counterproductive for the perpetrators (Abrahms 2006; 2011). Focusing on civilians tends to backfire on terrorist teams by reducing the probabilities that the federal government will grant concessions (Abrahms 2012; Abrahms & Gottfried 2016; Fortna 2015; Gaibulloev & Sandler 2009; Getmansky & Sinmazdemir 2018), strengthening the resolve of goal governments to pursue the terrorist group (Abrahms 2006; Berrebi & Klor 2008; Chowanietz 2010; Getmansky & Zeitzoff 2014), decreasing assist for the group among the many inhabitants (English 2016; Muro 2018; Stanton 2016), and even curbing the longevity of the group (Abrahms 2018; Cronin 2009; Lahoud 2012).

As a result of potential political prices, terrorist leaders usually eschew organizational accountability when operatives strike civilians (Abrahms & Conrad 2017), blame the terrorist assaults on rogue subordinates (Abrahms 2020), apologize for them (Abrahms 2018), and as a substitute brag over social media about their assaults on authorities forces quite than civilians (Abrahms, Beauchamp, & Mroszczyk 2017). Though the Strategic Mannequin is empirically contested, different explanations seem to supply appreciable explanatory energy notably in accounting for the rise of civilian violence in Africa. 

Organizational Competitors

There’s a wealthy literature on civilian concentrating on as a product of organizational competitors amongst insurgent or extremist teams. Wooden and Kathman (2015) discover that violence in opposition to civilians will increase when insurgent factions are engaged within the competitors. Intergroup competitors promotes civilian concentrating on as a result of this organizational rivalry can threaten entry to sources, improve the percentages of defection amongst civilians, and thereby incentivize predation in opposition to the inhabitants to maintain the teams. Raleigh (2012) additionally attributes civilian assaults to organizational competitors. Terrorism might help militant teams by creating chaos for governments and signaling power in comparison with rivals. Dowd (2019) applies this organizational rationalization to Sub-Saharan Africa, noting that the rise in civilian violence illustrates how violent Islamist teams “strategically adapt based on the quantity and relative exercise ranges of different armed actors” (Dowd 2019, p. 435).

The applying of inter-organizational theories of terrorism to Africa is wise given the fast rise of competitors amongst jihadist teams on the continent. With the fast demise of the Caliphate in Syria (Abrahms 2018), jihadists fighters have shifted lots of their operations from the Center East to Africa, which in flip fuels further violence as rivals jockey for sources, supporters, and credibility. This geographic pattern doesn’t look like short-lived. In a current BBC article, it was cited that based on Olivier Guitta with International Strat Danger Consultancy, “Africa goes to be the battleground of jihad for the following 20 years and it’s going to interchange the Center East” (Gardner 2020). Equally, Colin Clarke and Jacob Zenn predict that the battle between Islamic State and Al Qaeda associates “will drive competitors for status, recruits, and sources, metastasizing the menace” as teams vie for organizational dominance (Clarke and Zenn 2021).

Extra particularly, the Sahel area has emerged as a key battleground within the battle between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.  The pinnacle of the United Nations Workplace for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) has described the ensuing terrorist violence as “unprecedented” and famous that the “humanitarian penalties are alarming” with a five-fold improve in casualties from terrorism between 2016 to 2020 in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (‘Unprecedent terrorist violence’ 2020). A lot of the violence has emanated from the battle between the affiliated referred to as the Islamic State within the Better Sahara (ISGS) and the Al Qaeda affiliate Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). The 2 teams haven’t solely competed for sources, management over areas of operation, and recruits however have additionally been engaged in open hostilities in opposition to each other all through the the Sahel (Zenn and Clarke 2020). Civilians have paid the value for this inter-organizational battle (Parkinson, Phillips, & Strobel 2020). Rida Lyammouri from the Coverage Middle for the New South, a Morocco-based assume tank, warns that “we are going to proceed to see repercussions in opposition to people and communities who’re perceived to assist one group over the opposite” and “the implications for the civilians and the communities shouldn’t be one thing that we should always underestimate” (Tinti 2020). Within the Sahel, we thus see that regional specialists attribute the rise of terrorism to inter-group competitors in accordance with the theoretical literature on worldwide battle.

This competitors between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State – associates has additionally exacerbated battle within the Horn of Africa the place Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS)have fought to grow to be the dominant jihadist group within the nation since 2015, in the end declaring struggle on each other in late 2018. This battle has wide-reaching implications for civilian safety within the nation, particularly if the violence spreads from the sparsely-populated Puntland countryside to extra city facilities (Weiss 2019). This commentary in Africa—that violence in opposition to civilians has elevated as rival factions engaged in direct hostilities with each other—straight aligns with findings from Wooden and Kathman (2015), demonstrating why the Al Qaeda-Islamic State rivalry has—and sure will proceed—to contribute to a rising civilian dying toll all through the continent.

Rise of Non secular Extremism

Non secular extremism might also account for the elevated civilian concentrating on plaguing Africa. A considerable physique of analysis hyperlinks the concentrating on decisions of militant teams to their ideological orientation. Drake (1998) was among the many first students to look at how the ideological orientation of a bunch impacts its selection of targets. The terrorism literature hyperlinks non secular motives specifically to extra indiscriminate violence in opposition to civilians. This realization gained prominence within the Nineties when researchers recognized a “new” kind of terrorism. In comparison with the “previous terrorism, the “new terrorism” is characterised by elevated civilian concentrating on within the identify of faith, in addition to different options corresponding to nebulous political calls for and a larger of unclaimed assaults (Lesser et al. 1999). As Ranstorp (1996, p. 43) famous, this emergent wave of religiously motived terrorism was “unprecedented, not solely in its scope and the choice of targets but additionally in its lethality and indiscriminate character.” For the reason that Nineties, quite a few empirical research have discovered proof for a hyperlink between Islamist terrorist teams specifically and a propensity to conduct mass-casualty assaults in opposition to civilians (e.g., Abrahms, Maynard & Thaler 2018; Asal et al. 2009; Enders & Sandler 2000; Henne 2012; Juergensmeyer 2005; Moghadam 2008a; Wiktorowicz & Kaltner 2003). The connection between faith and civilian assaults is reportedly not simply correlated, however causal. With religiously motivated terrorism, killing turns into “an finish in itself,” based on Benjamin and Simon (2002, p. 420) quite than a politically dangerous instrument within the bargaining course of. No matter its sensible impacts by way of inducing concessions, the violence affords utility as an expression of the non secular mission (Juergensmeyer 1997, p. 19), making religiously motivated terrorists much less constrained of their concentrating on technique.

Whereas Islam itself shouldn’t be new in Africa, the interpretation of the faith has modified in current a long time, a minimum of amongst a important mass of the African Muslim inhabitants. The standard, extra tolerant Sufi type of Islam has been displaced by extra radical and divisive Salafist interpretations, which offer the theological spine for Sunni jihadist teams like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Based on Hussein Solomon of the College of the Free State in South Africa, Saudi Arabia has contributed to this unfold by constructing lots of of mosques throughout Africa by which this interpretation has been preached (Solomon 2017). Anthropologist Abdoulaye Sounaye, discussing Saudi Arabia’s funding of mosques in conflict-ridden international locations corresponding to Niger, Nigeria, and Mali, notes that “On this method (Saudi Arabia) create(s) areas for particular theological takes on Islam, specifically right here the Salafi pattern.” Sounaye underscores the connection between the unfold of the Saudi-backed Salafist teachings in Africa, radicalization and battle (Fröhlich 2019).  Along with Saudi involvement, different elements have pushed the adoption of Salafist teachings on the continent, together with unemployment among the many youth and the well-educated, which has been linked to the adoption of Salafist ideology in different components of the world (Quinn 2021), in addition to failed governance, which has created a spot for Salafist organizations to step in and supply social providers, thereby profitable assist from disaffected teams (Pelz 2017). Jihadist teams have used Salafist interpretations of Islam to explain its enemies, its missions and aims and its justification for using violence all in non secular terminologies (Moghadam 2008b), in the end contributing to a method that promotes anti-civilian violence as professional.

This rationalization accords with information in Africa linking excessive violence and spiritual interpretations. In Somalia, for instance, al-Shabaab has killed a minimum of 4,000 civilians from 2010-2019, based mostly on one conservative estimate (Maruf 2020). In Nigeria, Boko Haram has killed tens of 1000’s of civilians since 2009 (Campbell & Harwood 2018). In Mozambique, an Islamist insurgency within the northern a part of the nation has killed 2,600 folks within the final three years (Mwakideu 2021). The varied associates and franchises of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State that make up an elaborate community of jihadist terror organizations on the continent have been liable for 1000’s of different civilian deaths through the years. These Islamist teams loved a decade-long ascendancy on the continent with elevated freedom of operational exercise and, consequently, a gradual enlargement in violence concentrating on civilians. From June 2019 to June 2020, assaults on civilians by the Islamist teams elevated 47 per cent, accounting for 31 per cent of Islamist group exercise in Africa in comparison with 17 per cent in 2017 (African Militant Islamist Teams 2020). This proliferation of jihadist terrorist teams throughout the continent is undoubtedly a minimum of partially accountable for the rise in civilian concentrating on lately.    

Relatedly, disputes over non secular identities have exacerbated ethnic and useful resource conflicts in Africa.  Within the Central African Republic, the battle between Muslim Seleka and Christian anti-Balaka armed teams, fueled by hate speech and rhetoric, has pushed violence in opposition to civilians since 2013 (Schlein 2017). In Nigeria’s Center Belt, ongoing clashes between herdsmen and farmers, whereas traditionally primarily a resource-based battle, have taken on non secular and ethnic dimensions. This battle rose to grow to be the highest safety problem in Nigeria in 2018 after the dying rely surpassed that from Boko Haram (O’Grady 2018). In lots of circumstances, such disputes should not resulting from a “conflict of civilizations” (Huntington 1996) per se, however cultivated by militant leaders to additional their private and political agendas (McCauley 2017). When conflicts tackle non secular identities and justifications, civilians are sometimes the victims. 


Extremist violence will proceed to pose a safety problem to African international locations. On this article, we recognized the 2 primary causes of terrorist group competitors and renewed non secular hostilities notably for the reason that dissolution of the Islamic State’s Caliphate venture in Syria (Abrahms 2018). This record is hardly exhaustive. Different elements are additionally contributing to the rise of civilian assaults, together with the position of governments, which each perpetrate a lot of the violence and provoke terrorist retaliation. In tandem with terrorist assaults by non-state actors, civilian victimization by governments is on the rise in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Nsaibia 2020). Human rights teams have proven that authorities forces, in an effort to halt the unfold of terrorist violence, have focused civilians perceived as supportive of the extremists (Mednick 2020). Although these civilian deaths don’t come on the hand of terrorist teams straight, they usually strengthen them by radicalizing the inhabitants (Lake 2002). These points might be exacerbated by a shift in focus by world powers away from counterterrorism. The political violence literature has proven that terrorists thrive when situations are propitious. And energy vacuums afford terrorists with alternatives to recruit, assemble, and mount operations (Abrahms and Glaser 2017).

Because the US and different Western powers pivot from counterterrorism missions to the threats posed by China and Russia in an period of “Nice Energy Competitors” (Mattis 2018), terrorist organizations can have much more freedom to maneuver. In December 2020, the Trump administration introduced that it was pulling out its roughly 700 troops from Somalia, principally particular operations forces engaged in coaching and advising Somalia counterterrorism forces and in addition conducting missions concentrating on al-Shabaab (Cooper 2020). This determination has raised fears that the US withdrawal will result in a resurgence of the group (Kenya cautions US 2020). Even earlier than this determination, there have been rising considerations that counterterrorism efforts throughout the continent had been failing. Talking of the rising terrorism danger in West Africa and the Sahel, Basic Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, mentioned in March 2020 that “Western and worldwide and African efforts there should not getting the job completed” (Seldin 2020). Clearly, the civilian assaults in Africa are an equifinal phenomenon within the sense that there are a number of causal pathways to elucidate them. Competitors between terrorist teams and spiritual extremism proceed to hurt civilians, posing tough questions for governments each inside and out of doors Africa concerning the optimum response.

Determine 1. Violence in opposition to civilians in Africa, 2015–2020. Supply: ACLED.


Abrahms, M. (2006). Why Terrorism Does Not Work. Worldwide Safety 31(2): 42-78

Abrahms, M. (2008). What terrorists actually need: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism technique. Worldwide Safety, 32(4): 78-105.

Abrahms, M. (2011). Does Terrorism Actually Work? Evolution within the Typical Knowledge since 9/11. Defence and Peace Economics 22(6): 583-594.

Abrahms, M. (2012). The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited. Comparative Political Research 45(3): 366-393.

Abrahms, M. (2018). Correspondence: Ideological extremism in armed battle. Worldwide Safety 43(1): 186-190.

Abrahms, M., N. Beauchamp, and J. Mroszczyk (2017). What Terrorist Leaders Need: A Content material Evaluation of Terrorist Propaganda Movies. Research in Battle and Terrorism 40(11): 899-916.

Abrahms, M. and J. Conrad (2017). The Strategic Logic of Credit score Claiming: A New Idea for Nameless Assaults. Safety Research 26(2): 279-304.

Abrahms, M. and J. Glaser (2017). The pundits have been mistaken about Assad and the Islamic State. As ordinary, they’re not prepared to confess it. Los Angeles Instances, 10 December. Accessible at: https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-abrahms-glaser-isis-assad-20171210-story.html

Abrahms, M, J. L. Maynard, and Okay. Thaler (2018) Correspondence: Ideological extremism in armed battle. Worldwide Safety 43(1): 186-190.

Abrahms, M. and M. Gottfried (2016). Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Evaluation. Terrorism and Political Violence 28(1): 72-89.

African Militant Islamist Teams Set Document for Violent Exercise (2020). Africa Middle for Strategic Research, 21 July. Accessible at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-militant-islamist-groups-new-record-violent-activity/

Berrebi, C. and E. F. Klor (2008). Are voters delicate to terrorism? Direct proof from the Israeli voters. American Political Science Overview 102(3): 279-301.

Asal, V., R. Okay. Rethemeyer, I. Anderson, A. Stein, J. Rizzo, and M. Rozea (2009). The softest of targets: A research of terrorist goal choice. Journal of Utilized Safety Analysis 4(3):258-278.

Brown, W. (2010). Africa now on the coronary heart of world terrorism menace, based on a brand new index. The Guardian, 11 December. Accessible at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/africa-now-heart-global-terrorism-threat-according-new-index/

Campbell, J. and A. Harwood (2018). Boko Haram’s Lethal Impression. Council on International Relations, 20 August. Accessible at: https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact

Chowanietz, C. (2010). Rallying across the flag or railing in opposition to the federal government? Political events’ reactions to terrorist acts. Social gathering Politics 17(5): 673-698.

Clarke, C. P. and J. Zenn. (2021). ISIS and Al-Qaeda’s Sub-Saharan Associates Are Poised for Development in 2021. Protection One, 26 February. Accessible at: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/isis-and-al-qaedas-sub-saharan-affiliates-are-poised-growth-2021/172313/

Cooper, H. (2020). Trump Orders All American Troops Out of Somalia. The New York Instances, 16 December. Accessible at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/world/africa/trump-somalia-troop-withdrawal.html

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics 13(4): 379-399.

Cronin, A. Okay. (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton College Press.

Dugan, L., G. LaFree, and A. R. Piquero (2005). Testing a rational selection mannequin of airline hijackings. Criminology 43(4): 1031-1065.

Dowd , C. (2019). Fragmentation, Battle, and Competitors: Islamist Anti-civilian Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorism and Political Violence 31(3): 433-453.

Drake, C. J. (1998) The position of ideology in terrorists’ goal choice. Terrorism and Political Violence 10(2): 53-85.

Enders, W. and T. Sandler (2000). Is transnational terrorism changing into extra threatening? A time-series investigation. Journal of Battle Decision 44(3): 307-332.

English, R. (2016). Does Terrorism Work?: A Historical past. Oxford, UK: Oxford College Press.

Fortna, V. P. (2015). Do terrorists win? Rebels’ use of terrorism and civil struggle outcomes. Worldwide Group 69(3):519-556.

Fröhlich, S. (2019). Mosques in Africa: A take a look at of power within the Center East. Deutsche Welle, 18 December. Accessible at: https://www.dw.com/en/mosques-in-africa-a-test-of-strength-in-the-middle-east/a-51717439

Gaibulloev, Okay. and T. Sandler (2009). The impression of terrorism and conflicts on progress in Asia. Economics & Politics 21(3): 359–383.

Gardner, F. (2020). Is Africa overtaking the Center East as the brand new jihadist battleground? BBC, 3 December. Accessible at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55147863

Getmansky, A. and T. Sinmazdemir, T. (2018). Selecting violence: enlargement of Israeli outposts within the West Financial institution in response to terrorism. Research in Battle & Terrorism 41(3): 241-259.

Getmansky, A. and T. Zeitzoff (2014). Terrorism and voting: The impact of rocket menace on voting in Israeli elections. American Political Science Overview 108(3): 588-604.

Henne, P. S. (2012). The traditional hearth: Faith and suicide terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence 24(1): 38-60.

Huntington, S. (1996). The Conflict of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London:

Simon Schuster.

Juergensmeyer, M. (1997). Terror mandated by god. Terrorism and Political Violence 9(2): 16-23.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2005). Terror within the Thoughts of God: The International Rise of Non secular Violence. Berkeley: College of California Press.

Kenya cautions US in opposition to withdrawal of military from Somalia (2020). Garowe On-line, 18 October. Accessible at: https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/kenya-cautions-us-against-withdrawal-of-army-from-somalia#inbox/_blank

Kydd, A. H. and B. F. Walter (2006). The methods of terrorism. Worldwide Safety 31(1): 49-80.

Lahoud, N. (2012). Watch out for Imitators: Al-Qa’ida by means of the Lens of its Confidential Secretary. West Level, NY: Combating Terrorism Middle.

Lake, D. A. (2002). Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism within the Twenty-first Century. Dialogue IO 1(1): 15-29.

Lesser, I. O., et al (1999). Countering the brand new terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Company. Accessible at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR989.html

Mattis, J. N. (2018). Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the Nationwide Protection Technique. Division of Protection, 19 January. Accessible at: https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy/

Maruf, H. (2020). Al-Shabab Assaults Killed 4,000 in Previous Decade, Says Information-Gathering Group. Voice of America, 15 January. Accessible at https://www.voanews.com/africa/al-shabab-attacks-killed-4000-past-decade-says-data-gathering-group

McCauley, J. F. (2017) The Logic of Ethnic and Non secular Battle in Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge College Press.

Moghadam, A. (2008a). The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Assaults. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins College Press.

Moghadam, A. (2008b). The Salafi-Jihad as a Non secular Ideology. CTC Sentinel 1(3). Accessible at https://ctc.usma.edu/the-salafi-jihad-as-a-religious-ideology/

Mednick, S. (2020). Burkina Faso military blamed for extrajudicial torture, deaths. The Washington Put up, 24 August. Accessible at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-army-blamed-for-extrajudicial-torture-deaths/2020/08/24/ad86a104-e5e0-11ea-bf44-0d31c85838a5_story.html

Muro, D. (Ed.) (2018). When Does Terrorism Work? New York, NY: Routledge.

Mwakideu, C. (2021). Mozambique’s extremist violence poses menace for neighbors. Deutsche Welle, 29 March. Accessible at: https://www.dw.com/en/mozambiques-extremist-violence-poses-threat-for-neighbors/a-57043563

O’Grady, S. (2018). This little-known battle in Nigeria is now deadlier than Boko Haram. The Washington Put up, 26 July. Accessible at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/07/26/this-little-known-conflict-in-nigeria-is-now-deadlier-than-boko-haram/

Pape, R. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. The American Political Science Overview 97(3): 343-361.

Parkinson, J., M. M. Phillips, and W. P. Strobel. (2020). Fratricidal Conflict in West Africa Pits al Qaeda Towards Islamic State. The Wall Road Journal, 28 June. Accessible at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/fratricidal-clash-in-west-africa-pits-al-qaeda-against-islamic-state-11593360000

Pelz, D. (2017). Is Islamic extremism on the rise in Africa? Deutsche Welle, 28 Could. Accessible at: https://www.dw.com/en/is-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-africa/a-39001070

Quinn, N. (2021). From Separatism to Salafism: Militancy on the Swahili Coast. Council on International Relations, 13 January. Accessible at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/separatism-salafism-militancy-swahili-coast

Raleigh, C. (2012). Violence Towards Civilians: A Disaggregated Evaluation. Worldwide Interactions 38: 462-481.

Raleigh, C., Linke, A., Hegre, H. and Karlsen, J. (2010). Introducing ACLED: An Armed Battle Location and Occasion Dataset. Journal of Peace Analysis, 47(5), pp. 651-660.

Ranstorp, M. (1996). Terrorism within the Identify of Faith. Journal of Worldwide Affairs 50(1): 41-62.

Schlein, L. (2017). Rising Ethnic Tensions in CAR Gas Fears of Spike in Violence. Voice of America, 9 September. Accessible at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/rising-ethnic-tensions-car-fuel-fears-spike-violence

Seldin, J. (2020). Islamic State, Al-Qaida ‘On the March’ in Africa. Voice of America, 10 March. Accessible at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/islamic-state-al-qaida-march-africa

Solomon, S. (2017). As Africa Faces Extra Terrorism, Consultants Level to Saudi-spread of Fundamentalist Islam. Voice of America, 20 June. Accessible at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/africa-faces-more-terrorism-experts-point-saudi-spread-fundamentalist-islam

Stanton, J. A. (2016). Violence and restraint in civil struggle: civilian concentrating on within the shadow of worldwide regulation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge College Press.

Nsaibia, H. (2020). State Atrocities within the Sahel: The Impetus for Counterinsurgency Outcomes is Fueling Authorities Assaults on Civilians. ACLED, 20 Could. Accessible at: https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-the-sahel-the-impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians/

Tinti, P. (2020). Al-Qaida and ISIS Flip On Every Different within the Sahel, With Civilians within the Crossfire. World Politics Overview, 15 June. Accessible at https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28838/al-qaida-isis-turn-on-each-other-in-the-sahel-with-civilians-in-the-crossfire

‘Unprecedented terrorist violence’ in West Africa, Sahel area (2020). UN Information, 8 January. Accessible at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981

Weiss, C. (2019). Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab. CTC Sentinel 12(4). Accessible at https://ctc.usma.edu/reigniting-rivalry-islamic-state-somalia-vs-al-shabaab/

Wiktorowicz, Q. and J. Kaltner (2003). Killing within the identify of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s justification for September 11. Center East Coverage 10(2): 76-92.

Wooden, R. M. and J. D. Kathman (2015). Inter-rebel Competitors and Civilian Focusing on in Civil Struggle. Political Analysis Quarterly 68(1): 167-179.

Zenn, J. and C. P. Clarke (2020). Al-Qaeda and ISIS Had a Truce in Africa—Till They Didn’t. International Coverage, 26 Could. Accessible at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/26/al-qaeda-isis-west-africa-sahel-stability-jihadi-groups/

Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations